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Decided on June 10, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County
Valsac 908 LLC, Petitioner,
against
Santiago Crespo, Respondent,
John Doe, Jane Doe, Respondentsundertenants.

Index No. 307057/2021

Law Office of Allison M. Furman, PC (Allison M. Furman, Esq.), for the petitioner
New York Legal Assistance Group (Anthony Howden, Esq.), for respondent, Santiago
Crespo
Karen May Bacdayan, J.
Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219 (a) of the papers considered in review of this
motion by NYSCEF Doc No:
Papers

NYCEF Doc No.

Notice of motion, affirmation in support 16, 17
Affirmation in opposition to motion and exhibits thereto 18, 20, 21

Affidavit in opposition to motion 19
Reply affirmation 22
After oral argument and on the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order of the
court is as follows:

BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
This is a holdover proceeding commenced by Valsac 908 LLC ("petitioner") against
Santiago Crespo ("respondent"), and John Doe and Jane Doe, respondentundertenants. John
and Jane Doe have not appeared in this proceeding. Respondent has appeared by an attorney.
Undisputed is that respondent was the superintendent of the subject premises who came
into possession of the subject apartment as an incident to his employment by petitioner in
2017. (NYSCEF Doc. No 1, petition ¶2; NYSCEF Doc No. 19, Crespo affidavit ¶ 3.) His
employment as superintendent was terminated in October 2021. (Id. ¶ 5; NYSCEF Doc. No
17, petitioner's attorney's affirmation ¶ 3.) Respondent states that he "was wrongfully
terminated" from his job. [*2](NYSCEF Doc No 19, Crespo affidavit ¶ 5.)
After the proceeding was commenced, Respondents filed a "hardship declaration"
pursuant to the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act ("CEEFPA")
which had the effect of automatically staying the proceeding pending a determination of
eligibility. (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 8, as amended by L 2021, c 417, part A, § 4;
Admin Order of Chief Admin Judge of Cts AO/34/22]. On August 1, 2021, CEEFPA was
enjoined by the United States Supreme as violative of landlords' due process rights.
(Chrysafis v Marks, 594 US &mdash, 141 S Ct 2482 [2021] [". . . no man can be a judge in
his own case . . ."].) CEEFPA was modified three weeks later to address the Supreme Court's
concerns by including a mechanism through which a landlord could challenge the automatic
stay prompted by the filing of a hardship declaration. (L 2021, c 417, part C, subpart A.) The
hardship declaration stay provisions expired January 15, 2022.
On April 7, 2022, the same day that petitioner moved to have this proceeding restored to
the court's calendar as the stay occasioned by the filing of the hardship declaration had
expired, Respondents filed an Emergency Rental Assistance Program ("ERAP") application.
(NYSCEF Doc No. 14.) Like submission of a hardship declaration, submission of an
application for ERAP, has the effect of staying "all proceedings pending a determination of
eligibility." Thus, this proceeding was administratively stayed once the court was notified of

the application. (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 8, as amended by L 2021, c 417, part A,
§ 4; Admin Order of Chief Admin Judge of Cts AO/34/22.)
Petitioner has moved to vacate the ERAP stay as "[b]y virtue of his position as
superintendent, Respondent is not a tenant or occupant of the [a]partment obligated to pay
rent. Thus, [r]espondent does not meet the eligibility requirements of the ERAP statute."
(NYSCEF Doc No. 17, petitioner's attorney's affirmation ¶ 26.)
Respondent opposes petitioner's motion on that basis that the ERAP stay provisions
apply to this proceeding as the plain language of the statute is explicit and does not
distinguish between holdover and nonpayment proceedings. (NYSCEF Doc No. 18,
respondent's attorney's affirmation ¶¶ 1617.) Moreover, respondent argues, eligibility
determinations for ERAP are in the sole discretion of the commissioner of the Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"). (Id.) Finally, respondent argues that there is
only one exception when a holdover is permitted to proceed in the normal course after an
ERAP application is filed, and that is where the tenant is engaging in ongoing nuisance
behavior. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this court holds that it has the authority to consider whether or not to
vacate an ERAP stay. (See e.g. Laporte v Garcia, 2022 NY Slip Op 22126, *1 [Civ Ct, Bronx
County 2022], citing 2986 Briggs LLC v Evans, 2022 NY Slip Op. 50215 [U] [Civ Ct, Bronx
County 2022].) Indeed, to find otherwise would raise constitutional issues analogous to those
at issue in Chyrsafis v Marks. In Chrysafis, CEEFPA was enjoined because it did not allow a
landlord to challenge a tenant's selfcertified experience of a hardship which resulted in the
stay. The L 2021, ch 417 allowed for a hearing before the court to determine whether the
tenant was, in fact, suffering from a hardship, thereby warranting a continued stay. Similarly,
in the context of ERAP, the tenant "selfattest[s]" to eligibility for ERAP funding. (L 2021, c
56, part BB, subpart A, § 6 [6].) Thus, when a landlord challenges the automatic ERAP stay,
the court must determine whether the tenant has made a showing that it is so entitled, or risk
infringing on petitioner's due process rights.
To be eligible for ERAP funds an applicant must be "a tenant or occupant obligated to
pay rent." (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 5 [1] [a] [i].) Definitions in the original ERAP
statute, relevant here, remained unchanged when the statute was amended by L 2021, ch 417.
"Occupant" has the same meaning as under Real Property Law (RPL) Section 235f. (L 2021,

c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 2 [7].) RPL 235f defines "occupant" as "a person, other than a
tenant or a member of a tenant's immediate family, occupying a premises with the consent of
the tenant or tenants." "Rent" is as defined under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
(RPAPL) Section 702. (L 2021, c 56, part BB, subpart A, § 2 [9].) RPAPL 702 defines "rent"
as "the monthly or weekly amount charged in consideration for the use and occupation of a
dwelling pursuant to a written or oral rental agreement."
While the language of the statute provides for an automatic stay in both holdover and
nonpayment proceedings, many courts have found that the statute does not apply to licensees
as to do so would lead to an absurd result. (2986 Briggs LLC v Evans, 2022 NY Slip Op
50215 [U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2022]; PapadreaZavaglia v Arroyave, 2022 NY Slip Op
22109 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2022]; Silverstein v Huebner, et al.,Civ Ct, Kings County,
March 29, 2022, Stoller, J., index no. 94101/18.) Other courts have held that licensees may
benefit from the stay. See e.g. 24 W 55th St LLC v Mackler, NYLJ, Jan 12, 2022 at 17, c 2,
2021 NYLJ LEXIS 1276 (Civ Ct, New York County 2021). 560566 Hudson LLC v Hillman,
NYLJ, Mar 9, 2022 at 17, c 2., 2022 NYLJ LEXI 189 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2022].)
The court is aware of only two decisions regarding a motion to vacate an ERAP stay in
the context of a superintendent holdover. Both of those decisions granted the landlord's
motion. (Karan Realty Assoc. LLC v Perez, 2022 NY Slip Op 22093 [Civ Ct, Queens County
2022] [motion to lift ERAP stay granted as superintendent is not eligible and therefore it
would be futile to maintain the stay]; LSG 365 Bond Street LLC v Christopher Cusumano et
al, Civ Ct, Kings County, April 8, 2022, Donoghue, J., index no 311058/21 [superintendent
"is not covered by the express language of the statute"].) Respondent does not distinguish
these cases. Neither does respondent point the court to any decision where a stay was upheld
in a holdover proceeding based on a superintendent's termination of employment.
Most recently, this court denied a petitioner's motion to vacate an ERAP stay in the
context of an illegal sublet holdover. (EQRHudson Crossing, LLC v Magana, 2022 NY Slip
Op 22178 [Civ Ct, New York County 2022].) That ruling was based on the plain language of
the statute which, as set forth above, applies to tenants with an obligation to pay rent as
specifically defined in the statute. The subtenant therein was undisputedly in possession of
the subject premises with the "consent of the tenant" pursuant to an agreement to pay "a
monthly amount in consideration for the use and occupation of the premises." (L 2021, c 56,
part BB, subpart A, § 2 [7], [9].)
Here, the court's ultimate determination is distinct from its recent ruling in EQRHudson

Crossing, but the holding is constructed from the same reasoning. The definitions section of
the ERAP statute, which informs the eligibility criteria, is unambiguous. (Commonwealth o(
N Mariana Islands v Canadian Imperial Bank o(Com .. 21NY3d55 , 60 [2013] ["[W]here
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give
effect to the plain meaning of the words used"].)
Respondent may be an occupant of the premises, but respondent is not "a person, other
than a tenant or a member of a tenant's immediate family, occupying a premises with the
consent of the tenant or tenants." (L 2021 , c 56, part BB, subpart A,§ 2 [7] ; RPL § 235-f.)
Moreover, it [*3]is not disputed that respondent has never paid a weekly or monthly amount
of rent in consideration for the use and occupancy of the apartment. In fact, respondent does
not pay rent for the premises in consideration for his job as superintendent.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that petitioner's motion to vacate the ERAP stay is GRANTED, and case is
adjourned for all purposes to July 11, 2022 at 3: 30. The parties are to appear in person in Part
F, Room 523 at 111 Centre Street, New York, NY
Dated: June 10, 2022
New York, NY
HON. KAREN MAY BACDAYAN
Judge, Housing Part
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